Abstract. We develop a general criterion for cut elimination in sequent calculi for propositional modal logics, which rests on absorption of cut, contraction, weakening and inversion by the purely modal part of the rule system. Our criterion applies also to a wide variety of logics outside the realm of normal modal logic. We give extensive example instantiations of our framework to various conditional logics. For these, we obtain fully internalised calculi which are substantially simpler than those known in the literature, along with leaner proofs of cut elimination and complexity. In one case, conditional logic with modus ponens and conditional excluded middle, cut elimination and complexity were explicitly stated as open in the literature.
Introduction
Cut elimination, originally conceived by Gentzen [7] , is one of the core concepts of proof theory and plays a major role in particular for algorithmic aspects of logic, including the complexity of automated reasoning and, via interpolation, modularity issues. The large number of logical calculi that are currently in use, in particular in various areas of computer science, motivates efforts to define families of sequent calculi that cover a variety of logics and admit uniform proofs of cut elimination, enabled by suitable sufficient conditions. Here, we present such a method for modal sequent calculi that applies to possibly non-normal normal modal logics, which appear, e.g. in concurrency and knowledge representation. We use a separation of the modal calculi into a fixed underlying propositional part and a modal part. The core of our criterion, that we call the absorption of cut, stipulates that an application of the cut rule to conclusions of modal rules can be replaced by a single rule application. This concept generalises the notion of resolution closed rule set [14, 18] , dropping the assumption that the logic at hand is rank-1, i.e. axiomatised by formulas in which the nesting depth of modal operators is uniformly equal to 1 (such as K). where p ∈ V and ♥ ∈ Λ is n-ary. We use standard abbreviations of the other propositional connectives ⊤, ∨ and →. A Λ-sequent is a finite multiset of Λ-formulas, and the set of Λ-sequents is denoted by S(Λ). We write the multiset union of Γ and ∆ as Γ, ∆ and identify a formula A ∈ F(Λ) with the singleton sequent containing only A. If S ⊆ F(Λ) is a set of formulas, then an S-substitution is a mapping σ : V → S. We denote the result of uniformly substituting σ(p) for p in a formula A by Aσ. This extends pointwise to Λ-sequents so that Γσ = A 1 σ, . . . , A n σ if Γ = A 1 , . . . , A n . If S ⊆ F(Λ) is a set of Λ-formulas and A ∈ F(Λ), we say that A is a propositional consequence of S if there exist A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ S such that A 1 ∧ · · · ∧ A n → A is a substitution instance of a propositional tautology. We write S ⊢ PL A if A is a propositional consequence of S and A ⊢ PL B for {A} ⊢ PL B for the case of single formulas.
Modal Deduction Systems
To facilitate the task of comparing the notion of provability in both Hilbert and Gentzen type proof systems, we introduce the following notion of a proof rule that can be used, without any modifications, in both systems. where n ≥ 0 and Γ 0 , . . . , Γ n are Λ-sequents. The sequents Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n are the premises of the rule and Γ 0 its conclusion. A rule Γ 0 without premises is called a Λ-axiom, which we denote by just its conclusion, Γ 0 . A rule set is just a set of Λ-rules, and we say that a rule set R is substitution closed, if Γ 1 σ . . . Γ n σ/Γ 0 σ ∈ R whenever Γ 1 . . . Γ n /Γ 0 ∈ R and σ : V → F(Λ) is a substitution.
In view of the sequent calculi that we introduce later, we read sequents disjunctively. Consequently, a rule Γ 1 . . . , Γ n /Γ 0 can be used to prove the disjunction of Γ 0 , provided that Γ i is provable, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We emphasise that a rule is an expression of the object language, i.e. it does not contain meta-linguistic variables. As such, it represents a specific deduction step rather than a family of possible deductions, which helps to economise on syntactic categories. In our examples, concrete rule sets are presented as instances of rule schemas.
Example 3.2. For the modal logics K, K4 and T , we fix the modal signature Λ = { } consisting of a single modal operator with arity one. The language of conditional logic is given by the similarity type Λ = {⇒} where the conditional arrow ⇒ has arity 2. We use infix notation and write A ⇒ B instead of ⇒ (A, B) for A, B ∈ F(Λ). Formulas A ⇒ B are interpreted as various forms of conditionals, e.g. default implication 'if A then normally B', relevant implication and others, depending on the choice of semantics and imposed logical principles. Deduction over modal and conditional logics are governed by the following rule sets: (1) The rule set K associated to the modal logic K consists of all instances of the necessitation rule (N) and the distribution axiom (D) in Figure 1 . The rule sets that axiomatise the logics T and K4 arise by extending this set with the reflexivity axiom (R) and the (4)-axiom, respectively. We reserve the name (T) for the reflexivity rule in a cut-free system. (2) The basic conditional logic is the system CK of [3] , axiomatised by the rule set that consists of all instances of (RCEA) and (RCK) in Figure 2 . The system CK constitutes a minimal set of properties to be reasonably expected of any conditional, however nonstandard: replacement of equivalents in the left hand argument, and compatibility with conjunction in the right-hand argument. Additional properties are typically imposed when more specific interpretations of ⇒ are intended. E.g. the basic properties of ⇒ viewed as a default implication are given by Burgess' System S [2] , which is related to the well-known KLM postulates of default reasoning [11] . A treatment of System S using methods of the present work and [14] is presented in [19] . Here, we consider several other standard axioms, namely identity (ID), conditional modus ponens (MP) and conditional excluded middle (CEM), also given in Figure 2 . We denote the corresponding extensions of CK by juxtaposition of the respective axioms, e.g. CKMPCEM contains the rules for CK and the axioms (MP) and (CEM). As indicated above, whether or not these axioms are accepted depends on the intended reading of the conditional. E.g., modus ponens is a reasonable principle for interpretations of the conditional as a relevant implication or as a counterfactual, but not for default implication; conditional excluded middle is a controversially discussed property of the subjunctive conditional [6] . The identity axiom, while accepted for many interpretations of the conditional including as default implication, is typically rejected for causal interpretations [8] . Rules with more than one premise arise through saturation of a given rule set under cut that, e.g. leads to the rules (CK g ) and (MP g ) presented in Section 6.
In order to make the mapping between Hilbert-style and Gentzen-style systems easier, we take the derivability predicate of a Hilbert-system to be induced by a set of Λ-rules and read each sequent as the disjunction of its elements. The notion of deduction in modal Hilbert systems then takes the following form. Definition 3.3. Suppose R is a set of rules. The set of R-derivable formulas in the Hilbertsystem given by R is the least set of formulas that • contains Aσ whenever A is a propositional tautology and σ is a substitution • contains B whenever it contains A and A → B • contains Γ 0 whenever it contains Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n and
In other words, the set of derivable formulas is the least set that contains propositional tautologies, is closed under uniform substitution, modus ponens and application of rules. We will later consider Hilbert systems that induce the same provability predicate based on the following notion of admissibility. Definition 3.4. A rule set R ′ is admissible in HR if HR ⊢ A ⇐⇒ H(R ∪ R ′ ) ⊢ A for all formulas A ∈ F(Λ). Two rule sets R, R ′ are equivalent if R is admissible in HR ′ and R ′ is admissible in HR.
In words, R ′ is admissible in HR if adding the rules R ′ to those of R leaves the set of provable formulas unchanged. We note the following trivial, but useful consequence of admissibility.
Lemma 3.5. Let R and R ′ be equivalent, and let A ∈ F(Λ). Then HR ⊢ A iff HR ′ ⊢ A.
The next proposition establishes a rudimentary form of proof normalisation in Hilbert systems and is the key for proving equivalence of Hilbert and Gentzen-type systems. We show that every derivable formula in a Hilbert-sytem is a propositional consequence of conclusions of rules with provable premises, which stratifies proofs into rule application and propositional reasoning and avoids modus ponens. Proposition 3.6. Suppose that S is the least set of formulas that is closed under propositional consequences of rule conclusions, that is, S contains A ∈ F(Λ) whenever there are rules Θ 1 /Γ 1 , . . . , Θ n /Γ n ∈ R and substitutions σ 1 , . . . , σ n : V → F(Λ) such that ∆σ i ∈ S for all ∆ ∈ Θ i (i = 1, . . . , n), and { Γ 1 σ, . . . , Γ n σ} ⊢ PL A.
Then S coincides with the set of derivable formulas in the Hilbert-calculus induced by R, that is S = {A ∈ F(Λ) | HR ⊢ A}.
Proof. We write HT(R) = {A ∈ F(Λ) | HR ⊢ A} for the set of provable formulas in HR. The inclusion S ⊆ HT(R) is immediate as HT(R) contains propositional tautologies, is closed under uniform substitution and modus ponens. For the reverse inclusion we show that S is closed under R-derivability as considered in Definition 3.3.
This is clear for all cases (propositional tautologies, uniform substitutions, rule application) except possibly modus ponens. So assume that HR ⊢ A → B and HR ⊢ A. By induction hypothesis, there are
A and moreover Ξσ ∈ S whenever Ξ ∈ Θ 1 , . . . , Θ n , Σ 1 , . . . , Σ k . The claim follows, as
In other words, in a modal Hilbert system, each provable formula is a propositional consequence of rule conclusions with provable premises. This result forms the basis of our comparison of Hilbert and Gentzen systems. The point to note is that in a Hilbert system, provable formulas are propositional consequences of zero or more rule conclusions with provable premises. The propositional reasoning that is applied when showing that the set of conclusions implies a formula generally uses the cut-rule. As a consequence, the need for cut vanishes if there is no need to apply propositional reasoning to combine conclusions. This is what our notion of cut-absorption (introduced later in Definition 4.5) formalises: we show that cut elimination essentially amounts to the fact that -in the corresponding Hilbert system -each valid formula is a consequence of a at most one rule conclusion with provable premise.
We now set the stage for sequent systems that we are going to address in the remainder of the paper. As we are dealing with extensions of classical propositional logic, it suffices to work with a right-handed calculus. Our calculus is equipped with explicit negation, and therefore precisely dual to modal tableau calculi [9] that serve as the usual basis for syntactically determining the complexity of the satisfiability problem.
The notion of derivability in the sequent calculus associated with a rule set R is formulated parametric in terms of a set X of additional rules that will later be instantiated with relativised versions of cut, weakening, contraction and inversion.
Definition 3.7. Suppose R and X are sets of Λ-rules. The set of GR + X-derivable sequents in the Gentzen-system given by R is the least set of sequents that • contains A, ¬A, Γ for all sequents Γ ∈ S(Λ) and formulas A ∈ F(Λ) • contains ¬⊥, Γ for all Γ ∈ S(Λ)
• is closed under instances of the rule schemas
where A ∈ F(Λ) ranges over formulas and Γ ⊆ F(Λ) over multisets of formulas. We call the above rules the propositional rules and the formula occurring in the conclusion but not in Γ principal in the respective rule.
• is closed under the rules in R ∪ X, i.e. it contains Γ 0 whenever it contains Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n and
We write GR + X ⊢ Γ if Γ can be derived in this way and GR ⊢ Γ if X = ∅. As for Hilbertstyle calculi (Definition 3.4), we call a rule set
The set X of extra rules will later be instantiated with a relativised version of the cut rule and additional axioms that locally capture the effect of weakening, contraction and inversion, applied to rule premises. This allows to formulate local conditions for the admissibility of cut that can be checked on a per-rule basis. Many other formulations of sequent systems only permit axioms of the form Γ, p, ¬p where p ∈ V is a propositional atom. The reason for being more liberal here is that this makes it easier to prove admissibility of uniform substitution, at the expense of losing depthpreserving admissibility of structural rules. We come back to this matter in Remark 4.4. The following proposition is readily established by an induction on the provability predicate HR ⊢.
The remainder of the paper is concerned with the converse of the above proposition, which relies on specific properties of the rule set R.
Generic Modal Cut Elimination
In order to establish the converse of Proposition 3.8 we need to establish that the cut rule is admissible in the Gentzen system GR defined by the ruleset R. Clearly, we cannot expect that cut elimination holds in general: it is well known (and easy to check) that the sequent system arising from the rule set consisting of all instances of (N) and (D), presented in Example 3.2 does not enjoy cut elimination. In other words, we have to look for constructions that allow us to transform a given rule set into one for which cut elimination holds. The main result of our analysis is that cut elimination holds if the rule set under consideration satisfies four crucial requirements that are local in the sense that they can be checked on a per-rule basis without the need of carrying out a fully-fledged cut-elimination proof: absorption of weakening, contraction, inversion and cut.
The first three properties can be checked for each rule individually and amount to the admissibility of the respective principle, and the last requirement amounts to the possibility of eliminating cut between a pair of rule conclusions. We emphasise that these properties can be checked locally for the modal rules, and cut elimination will follow automatically. It is not particularly surprising that cut elimination holds under these assumptions. However, isolating the four conditions above provides us with means to convert a modal Hilbert system into an equivalent cut-free sequent calculus. We now introduce relativised versions of the structural rules that will be the main tool in the proof of cut elimination. This can be seen as permutability of structural rules: every derivation of Γ from premises Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n that ends in weakening, inversion or contraction is applied can be replaced by a derivation of Γ where weakening, inversion and contraction is only applied to the premises Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n . Definition 4.1. Suppose Γ is a Λ-sequent and let A(Γ) consist of the axioms
We say that a rule set R absorbs the structural rules if
In other words, a deduction step that applies weakening, contraction or inversion to a rule conclusion can be replaced by a (possibly different) rule where the corresponding structural rules are applied to the premises. We discuss a number of standard examples before stating that absorption of the structural rules implies their admissibility.
Example 4.2. The rule sets containing all instances of either of the following rule schemas (K), (T), and (K4), respectively,
. . , ¬ A n , B, Γ absorb the structural rules. We note that (K) absorbs weakening due to the presence of Γ in the conclusion, and the absorption of contraction in (T) and (K4) is a consequence of the presence of the negated -formulas in the premise. The absorption of inversion in a consequence of the weakening context Γ in (K) and (K4) and implied by duplicating the context Γ in (T). On the other hand, the rule sets defined by
¬A, Γ ¬ A, Γ fail to absorb the structural rules: the rule on the left fails to absorb weakening, whereas the right-hand rule does not absorb contraction. 
where Γ ∈ S(Λ) and A, A 1 , A 2 ∈ F(Λ) are admissible in GR.
Proof. Standard induction on proofs in GR where the case of propositional rules is standard and the inductive case for modal rules immediately follows from absorption.
Remark 4.4.
(1) The main purpose for introducing the notion of absorption of structural rules (Definition 4.1) is to have a handy criterion that guarantees admissibility of the structural rules (Proposition 4.3). Our definition offers a compromise between generality and simplicity. In essence, a rule set absorbs structural rules if an application of weakening, contraction or inversion can be pushed up one level of the proof tree. A weaker version of Definition 4.1 would require that an application of weakening, contraction or inversion to a rule conclusion can be replaced by a sequence of deduction steps where the structural rule in question can not only be applied to the premises of the rule, but also freely anywhere else, provided that these additional applications are smaller in a well-founded ordering. However, we are presently not aware of any examples where this extra generality would be necessary. (2) In many sequent systems, the statement of Proposition 4.3 can be strengthened to say that weakening, contraction and inversion are depth-preserving admissible, i.e. does not increase the height of the proof tree. This is in general false for the systems considered here as axioms are of the form A, ¬A, Γ for A ∈ F(Λ) and, for instance, (A∧B), ¬(A∧B) is derivable with a proof of height one (being an axiom), but, e.g. A ∧ B, ¬A, ¬B cannot be established by a proof of depth one (not being an axiom). It is easy to see that weakening, inversion and contraction are in fact depth-preserving admissible if only atomic axioms of the form p, ¬p, Γ are allowed, for p ∈ V a propositional variable. The more general form of axioms adopted in this paper allows us to simplify many constructions as we do not have to consider a congruence rule explicitly which would allow us to prove (rather than to assume as axioms) sequents of the form A, ¬ A, Γ.
Having dealt with the structural rules, we now address our main concern: the admissibility of the cut rule. In contrast to the absorption of structural rules, we need one additional degree of freedom in that we need to allow ourselves to apply cut to a structurally smaller formula. 
A ruleset R absorbs cut, if for all rules (r 1 )
where Cut(A, r 1 , r 2 ) consists of all instances of the rule schemas
where size(C) < size(A) in the leftmost rule and i = 1, 2 in the rightmost schema, together with the axioms Γ 1 , . . . , Γ n , ∆ 1 , . . . , ∆ k and all sequents of the form Γ, ∆ where Γ, ∆ ∈ S(Λ) and, for some B ∈ F(Λ),
A rule set that absorbs structural rules and the cut rule is called absorbing.
The intuition behind the above definition is similar to that of absorption of structural rules, but we have two additional degrees of freedom: we can not only apply the cut rule to rule premises, but we can moreover freely use both cut on structurally smaller formulas and the structural rules. This allows us to use the standard argument, a double induction on the structure of the cut formula and the size of the proof tree, to establish cut elimination. This is carried out in the proof of the next theorem.
Proof. We use Gentzen's classical method and proceed by a double induction on the size of the cut formula and the size of the proof tree. That is, we prove the statement
by induction on size(A) where, in the inductive step, we use a side induction on the size of proof trees, as indicated by the subscript of the entailment sign. Formally, the relation ⊢ n is defined inductively by ⊢ 1 Γ, A, ¬A and
where, in the last rule,
We may inductively assume that the statement holds for all cut formulas C < A and to prove the statement for A we have to consider the following cases: (1) cuts that arise between two rule conclusions (2) cuts that arise between a rule conclusion and the conclusion of a propositional rule or axiom (3) cuts that arise between two propositional rules. We start with item (1), which follows directly from the fact that R absorbs cut. In more detail, suppose that
As R absorbs cut, we have that F 0 , G 0 is derivable using cuts on formulas < A from the additional assumptions Γ, ∆ provided that for some D ∈ F(Λ) we have that both Γ, D and ∆, ¬D are among the F 1 , . . . , F k , G 1 , . . . , G l . In case Γ, D = ∆, ¬D we have that Γ ⊆ Γ, ∆ and ⊢ Γ, ∆ as weakening is admissible in GR. Assuming that ⊢ x Γ, D and ⊢ y ∆, ¬D for Γ, D = ∆, ¬D we have that x + y < 2 + i n i + j m j and hence ⊢ Γ, ∆ by (inner) induction hypothesis. The fact that -in the deduction of F 0 , G 0 -we may also have to use cuts on formulas < A is discharged by the outer induction hypothesis and possible uses of weakening, contraction and inversion are admissible by Proposition 4.3.
As regards item (2) we only discuss a subset of the cases that showcase the need for contraction, weakening and inversion to be admissible. For the whole discussion, suppose that
• Suppose that F 0 = F ′ 0 , A and G 0 , ¬A is an axiom. In case A ∈ G 0 we have that
A as GR admits weakening. In case ¬A / ∈ G 0 we have that G 0 is an axiom, and hence so is G 0 , F ′ 0 .
• Suppose that F 0 = F ′ 0 , A and ¬A, G 0 has been derived using (¬∧). We have to discuss two cases, depending on whether or not ¬A is principal in the application of (¬∧).
As cuts on A ′ and B ′ can be eliminated by induction hypothesis, we have
All the other cases follow exactly the same pattern. We now focus on item (3) , that is, we show how cuts between the conclusions of propositional rules and axioms can be eliminated. This is mostly standard and again we only discuss a subset of the cases. Suppose that ⊢ n F 0 , A and ⊢ m G 0 , ¬A.
• If both F 0 , A and G 0 , ¬A are axioms, then so is F 0 , G 0 .
• Suppose that F 0 , A has been derived using (∧) and G 0 , ¬A has been derived using (¬∧).
We distinguish four cases depending on whether or not A is principal in the application of (∧) or (¬∧).
If A is principal in the application of (¬∧), we have that ⊢ m−1 G 0 , ¬A ′ , ¬B ′ . By (outer) induction hypothesis, cuts on A ′ and B ′ can be eliminated so that we have ⊢ F 0 , F 0 , G 0 and it follows from closure under contraction that ⊢ F 0 , G 0 . If A is not principal in the application of (¬∧) we have that
and n + (m − 1) < n + m we can apply the inner induction hypothesis to eliminate the cut on A so that ⊢ F 0 , ¬C, ¬D, G ′ 0 and applying (¬∧) gives
The two cases where A is not principal in the application of (¬∧) follow exactly the same pattern. The remaining cases of cuts between propositional rules and axioms are entirely analogous, and therefore omitted.
We illustrate the preceding theorem by using it to derive the well-known fact that cutelimination holds for the modal logics K, K4 and T and use it to derive cut-elimination for various conditional logics in Section 6.
Example 4.7. The rule sets K, K4 and T are absorbing. We have already seen that they absorb weakening, contraction and inversion in Example 4.2 so everything that remains to be seen is that they also absorb cut. For (K), we need to apply cut to a formula of smaller size. For the two instances
we need to consider, up to symmetry, the cases A i = B 0 , A i ∈ ∆ and ¬ A 0 ∈ ∆, for i = 1, . . . , n. Here, we only treat the first case for i = 1 where we have to show that ¬ A 2 , . . . , ¬ A n , A 0 , ¬ B 1 , . . . , ¬ B k , Γ, ∆ is derivable from GR + Cut( A 1 , r 1 , r 2 ), which follows as the latter system allows us to apply cut on A 1 = B 0 . The case A i ∈ ∆ and ¬ A 0 ∈ ∆ are straight forward.
The argument to show that (K4) is absorbing is similar, and uses an additional (admissible) instance of cut on a formula of smaller size and contraction. For (T) we only consider instances of cut between two conclusions of
We only demonstrate the case A ∈ ∆. In this case, ∆ = ∆ ′ , A and we have to show that ¬ B, Γ, ∆ ′ can be derived in Cut( A, r 1 , r 2 ). The latter system allows us to cut ¬ A between the conclusion of (T) on the left and the premise of the right hand rule, i.e., we have that Cut( A, r 1 , r 2 ) ⊢ ¬B, ¬ B, Γ, ∆ ′ ) and an application of (T) now gives derivability of ¬ B, Γ, ∆ ′ .
Equivalence of Hilbert and Gentzen Systems
We now investigate the relationship between provability in a Hilbert-system and provability in the associated Gentzen system. We note the following standard lemmas that we will use later on.
Lemma 5.1. Suppose that Λ is a modal similarity type and R is a set of Λ-rules.
(1) Let A ∈ F(Λ) be a propositional tautology. Then GR ⊢ A. (2) Let R be closed under substitution and Γ ∈ S(Λ). Then GR ⊢ Γσ whenever GR ⊢ Γ.
Remark 5.2. Being able to prove the previous lemma is the main reason for formulating axioms as A, ¬A, Γ where A ∈ F(Λ) rather than p, ¬p, Γ. Both formulations are equivalent if the modal congruence rule
However, Lemma 5.1 can be proved without the assumption that congruence is admissible using axioms of the form A, ¬A, Γ. Theorem 5.3. Suppose R is absorbing and substitution closed. Then GR ⊢ Γ ⇐⇒ HR ⊢ Γ for all Γ ∈ S(Λ).
Sketch. We only need to show the direction from right to left. Inductively assume that HR ⊢ Γ for Γ ∈ S(Λ). By Proposition 3.8 we have that there are rules Θ i /Γ i and substitutions σ i , i = 1, . . . , n such that
By induction hypothesis, GR ⊢ ∆σ i for all i = 1, . . . , n and ∆ ∈ Θ i . By Lemma 5.1 we have
The claim follows by applying cut, contraction and inversion.
The construction of an absorbing rule set from a given set of axioms and rules essentially boils down to adding the missing instances of cut, weakening, contraction and inversion to a given rule set. The soundness of this process is witnessed by the following two trivial lemmas (both of which rest on the fact that HR incorporates full propositional reasoning). We use these to derive an absorbing rule set for K in the present section, and to establish cut-elimination for a large range of conditional logics in the next section.
The same applies to instances of the structural rules of weakening, contraction and inversion.
As we wish to extend the rule set while leaving the provability predicate in the Hilbert calculus unchanged, the following formulation is handy for our purposes -in particular it implies that we can freely use structural rules both in the premise and conclusion.
This gives us a recipe for constructing rule sets that absorb contraction and cut: simply add more rules according to the lemmas above. This will not change the notion of provability in the Hilbert system, but when this process terminates, the ensuing rule set will be absorbing and gives rise to a cut free sequent calculus.
Example 5.6 (Modal Logic K). In a Hilbert-style calculus, the axiomatisation of K is usually described in terms of the distribution axiom (which we view as a rule with empty premise) and the necessitation rule: gives admissibility of the left hand rule below,
and continuing in this way and absorbing weakening, we obtain admissibility of the rule on the right, where Γ ∈ S(Λ) is an arbitrary context. We have shown previously that this rule set is absorbing, and it is easy to see that it is equivalent to the rule set consisting of all instances of (N) and (D).
Applications: Sequent Calculi for Conditional Logics
After having seen how the construction of absorbing rule sets gives rise to cut-elimination for a number of well-studied normal modal logics, in this section we construct a cut-free sequent calculus for a number of conditional logics.
Conditional logics [3] are extensions of propositional logic by a non-monotonic conditional A ⇒ B, read as "B holds under the condition that A". Formulas of the form A ⇒ B or ¬(A ⇒ B) are called conditional literals, and in such a conditional literal, we refer to A as the (conditional) antecedent and to B as the (conditional) consequent. The conditional implication is non-monotonic in general, i.e. the validity of A ⇒ B does not imply that (A ∧ C) ⇒ B is also a valid statement.
Axiomatically, the first argument A of the conditional operation A ⇒ B behaves like the in neighbourhood frames and only supports replacement of equivalents, whereas the second argument B obeys the rules of K. We recall from Example 3.2 (see also Figure 2 ) that CK is axiomatised by the rules (RCEA) and (RCK) that we augment with a subset of (ID), (MP) and (CEM). For each system, we apply Lemma 5.5 and Lemma 5.4 to the given rule sets repeatedly to generate new rules that are automatically sound over the original Hilbert system. This procedure leads to the rules summarised in Figure 3 where we have used the following notational shorthand to express the equivalences in the premise of CK: Notation 6.1. If A 0 , . . . , A n ∈ F(Λ) are conditional formulas, we write A 0 = · · · = A n for the sequence of sequents consisting of ¬A 0 , A i and ¬A i , A 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We now discuss the arising system in detail, and start with those not containing (CEM) and then proceed to add (CEM) as an additional principle. For each system, we show cut-free completeness and develop the format of the respective rules as we go along. In summary, we obtain the following cut-free sequent calculi for extensions of (CK) summarised in Figure  4. 6.1. Cut Elimination for Extensions of CK without CEM. We first treat extensions of the basic conditional logic CK with axioms ID and MP, but not including CEM and discuss CEM later, as the effect of adding CEM leads to a more general form of the CK rule. If we absorb cuts using Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5 we see that all instances of
It is easy to see that the rule set CK g is actually absorbing: Theorem 6.2. The rule set CK g is absorbing and equivalent to CK. As a consequence, GCK g has cut-elimination and GCK g ⊢ A iff HCK ⊢ A whenever A ∈ F(Λ).
Proof. Using Lemmas 5.4 and Lemma 5.5 it is immediate that the rule set CK g is admissible in HCK. The argument that shows that CK g is absorbing is analogous to that for the modal logic K (Example 4.7), and the result follows from Theorem 5.3. Again applying the same lemma, this time to a general instance of (CK) and the rule that we just derived, that is,
that can be again seen to be admissible by Lemma 5.5. It is easy to see that both (CK) and (ID) are derivable under (CKID), and we note that (CKID g ) is admissible by construction. If we denote the rule set consisting of all instances of CKID by CKID g , we obtain: Proposition 6.3. The rule set CKID g is absorbing and equivalent to CKID.
Proof. It is easy to see that CKID g absorbs the structural rules, and that CKID is equivalent to CKID g .
To see that CKID g absorbs cut, we consider two instances of (CKID g ), say
and assume that the cut happens on F ∈ F(Λ). The case where F ∈ Γ, ∆ is straightforward, so assume without loss of generality that F = (A 0 ⇒ B 0 ) = (C 1 ⇒ D 1 ). By converting the equalities in the premise, and repeatedly applying cut on A 0 ≡ C 1 we obtain
so that we obtain the derivability of
where contraction on (C 0 ) was applied in the last step, shows that
is derivable in GCKID g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ), and applying CKID g to Σ 1 and Σ 2 gives (cut-free) derivability of the desired sequent ¬(
This completes the case distinction on F and hence the proof of the proposition.
Before we move to the next system, we briefly demonstrate the derivation of the identity axiom in CKID g .
Example 6.4. It is easy to say that GCKID g ⊢ A ⇒ A for all A ∈ F(Λ): we pick n = 0 to obtain the following instance of CKID g ¬A, A A ⇒ A and note that the premise is in fact an axiom.
The logic CKMP arises by augmenting the logic CK with the additional axiom (A ⇒ B) → (A → B). We briefly sketch the construction of the additional axiom that gives rise to the rule (MP g ) that we will use to establish cut-free completeness.
We consider a cut between an instance of (CK g ) and (MP), that is, we have the derivation
, C by putting C = A 0 → B 0 . By Lemma 5.4, this rule is admissible, and by Lemma 5.5 so is the rule A 1 , C ¬B 1 , C ¬(A 1 ⇒ B 1 ), C and absorbing the structural rules (in particular contraction on A ⇒ B and inversion) leads to the general form
where we have elided the subscripts. The effect of adding (MP) is similar to that of enriching the modal logic K with the (T)-axiom. We denote the rule set consisting of all instances of CK g and MP g by CKMP g . Our cut elimination theorem then takes the following form: Proposition 6.5. The rule set CKMP g is absorbing and equivalent to CKMP.
Proof. It is clear that both (CK g ) and (MP g ) absorb the structural rules. For cut, we first consider cuts between two instances of (MP g ), say
where the cut happens on F ∈ F(Λ). We distinguish several cases: Case F = (A ⇒ B) and F ∈ ∆. Then ∆ = (A ⇒ B), ∆ ′ for some ∆ ′ ∈ S(Λ). To eliminate the cut on C, we note that the following two derivations
witness that we can use both C, ¬(C ⇒ D), Γ, ∆ ′ and ¬D, ¬(C ⇒ D), Γ, ∆ ′ as axioms in CKMP g +Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ) as the cuts occur between the premises of (r 2 ) and conclusions of (r 1 ). Applying (MP g ) to these axioms, we obtain that CKMP g +Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ) ⊢ ¬(C ⇒ D), Γ, ∆ ′ .
Case F = (C ⇒ D) and F ∈ Γ. This is symmetric to the case above. Case F ∈ Γ and ¬F ∈ ∆. Then Γ = Γ ′ , F and ∆ = ∆ ′ , ¬F . We have to show that
is derivable in Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ). We note that the deduction
witnesses that we may use A, ¬(A ⇒ B), C, ¬(C ⇒ D), Γ ′ , ∆ ′ as an axiom in the system CKMP g + Cut (F, r 1 , r 2 ) as the cut on F has occurred between premises of r 1 and r 2 . The same deduction, with C replaced by ¬D throughout, witnesses that this is also the case for A, ¬(A ⇒ B), ¬D, ¬(C ⇒ D), Γ ′ , ∆ ′ . An application of (MP g ) now yields
By the symmetric argument (just replace A by ¬B) we obtain that also CKMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ) ⊢ ¬(C ⇒ D), ¬B, ¬(A ⇒ B), Γ ′ , ∆ ′ and an application of (MP g ) now yields
What is left is to consider cuts, say on F ∈ F(Λ), between the conclusions of the rules
, ∆ As before, we need to discuss several cases.
Case F ∈ Γ or ¬F ∈ Γ. Trivial, as the conclusion of the cut can be derived using a different weakening context Γ.
We assume without loss of generality that i = 1 and have that F = (A 1 ⇒ B 1 ) ∈ ∆ so that ∆ = ∆ ′ , F . To replace the cut on F , we consider the deduction
which witnesses that we may use
as an axiom in GCKMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ). The above deduction, with C replaced by ¬D throughout, witnesses that the same is true for
and applying (MP g ) with premises Σ 1 and
witnesses that we may use
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as an axiom in GCKMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ) as the cut on F occurs between a conclusion of (r 1 ) and a premise of (r 2 ). The same derivation, with ¬B 0 replaced by A 0 shows that the same is true for Σ 2 = ¬ (A 1 ⇒ B 1 ) , . . . , ¬(A n ⇒ B n ), A 0 , Γ, ∆. We therefore have the two derivations
in GCKMP g +Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ). Applying (MP g ) to the conclusions of both yields that GCKMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ) ⊢ Σ 3 where
. . , ¬B n , Γ, ∆ as GCKMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ) contains the contraction rule. We now iterate the same scheme, where we use weakening on a successively smaller subset of B 2 , . . . , B n . First, we note that
is a derivation in GCKMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ) and applying (MP g ) to Σ 3 and its conclusion yields GCKMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ) ⊢ Σ 4 where
Iterating this scheme, we finally obtain
Note that weakening and cuts on formulas of size < size(F ) is admissible in GCKMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ).
Case F = (A 0 ⇒ B 0 ) and ¬F ∈ ∆. We have that ∆ = ¬(A 0 ⇒ B 0 ), ∆ ′ and the deduction
as an axiom in GCKMP g + Cut (F, r 1 , r 2 ) . The same derivation, with C replaced by ¬D, shows that the same is true for
and applying (MP g ) with premises Σ 1 and Σ 2 yields the claim GCKMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ) ⊢ ¬ (A 1 ⇒ B 1 ) , . . . , ¬(A n ⇒ B n ), Γ, ∆ ′ . This finishes our analysis of cuts that may arise between conclusions of the (CK g ) and the (MP g )-rule, and hence the proof.
As an example, we give a derivation of (MP) in the system CKMP g (in fact, a single application of (MP g ) suffices).
Example 6.6. If expressed solely in terms of ∧ and ¬, conditional modus ponens takes the form ¬((A ⇒ B) ∧ A ∧ ¬B). The following derivation establishes that (MP) is derivable in the above form
We now consider the logic that arises by adding both conditional modus ponens (A ⇒ B) → (A → B) and the identity axiom A ⇒ A to the logic CK. In line with our naming conventions, this logic is called CKMPID. To obtain a cut-free axiomatisation of this logic, we consider the rule set CKMPID g containing all instances of CKID g and MP g . A close inspection of the proof of Proposition 6.5 gives that CKMPID g is absorbing, and therefore cut-free complete.
Proposition 6.7. The rule set CKMPID g is absorbing and equivalent to CKMPID.
Proof. We follow the same strategy (and consider the same cases) as in the proof of Proposition 6.5 where we note that the conclusions of CK g and CKID g are identical, the only difference being that in premise displayed on the far right in CK g and CKID g there is one additional (negative) literal in where CKID g . The proof of Proposition 6.5 can now be repeated literally by adding this extra literal to all instances of CK g , thus turning every instance of CK g in the proof of Proposition 6.5 into an instance of CKID g .
Cut Elimination for Extensions of CKCEM.
To construct an absorbing rule set for conditional logic plus the axiom
we start from the admissible rule set for CK and close under cuts that arise with (CEM). Repeated applications of Lemma 5.4 and Lemma 5.5 lead to the rule set
Proposition 6.8. The rule set CKCEM g is absorbing and equivalent to CKCEM.
Proof. Again, it suffices to check that the rule set CKCEM g is absorbing, where the absorption of structural rules is clear. It therefore suffices to treat instances of cuts between conclusions of rules of CKCEM. Owing to the form of the CKCEM g -rule, our argument is very similar to that used for CK g . We consider the following two instances
and assume that the conclusions permit an instance of cut on F ∈ F(Λ). As usual, we distinguish several cases, where the cases F ∈ Γ, F ∈ ∆, ¬F ∈ Γ and ¬F ∈ ∆ are trivial.
Case
Without loss of generality we assume that k = n and l = 0 and get A n = C 0 and B n = D 0 . Denote the sequent that arises from applying cut on F to the conclusions of r 1 and r 2 by Σ 0 and notice that, using cuts on A n ≡ C 0 , we have that
. This feeds into the derivation
for k > i and 1 ≤ l ≤ j is symmetric, which finishes the proof.
As a consequence, cut elimination holds in CKCEM g . We show of the (CEM) can be derived before moving on to the next calculus.
Example 6.9. If we spell out the abbreviatios of ∨ in terms of ¬ and ∧, the axiom of conditional excluded middle takes the form ¬(¬(A ⇒ B) ∧ ¬(A ⇒ ¬B)). The following derivation in CKCEM g shows that this form of the axiom is derivable.
In this derivation, we have chosen j = n = 1 and when applying (CKCEM g ) and choosing j = 0 yields an instance of (CK g ).
We now consider the extension of CK with both conditional excluded middle (A ⇒ B)∨(A ⇒ ¬B) and the identity axiom (A ⇒ A) and denote the ensuing logic by CKCEMID. As in the construction of the rule set CKID g , we construct a rule set by applying Lemma 5.4 and 5.5 by considering cuts between an instance of (CKCEM g ) (left) and a rule arising from a cut between (CK g ) and the identity axiom (right) (A j+1 ⇒ B j+1 ) , . . . , ¬(A n ⇒ B n ), Γ that provides a cut-free axiomatisation of CKCEMID, as we now show. Proposition 6.10. The rule set CKCEMID g is equivalent to CKCEMID and absorbing.
Proof. Just as in the proof of Proposition 6.8 we consider cuts between two instances of (CKCEMID g ) and note that the premises of (CKCEM g ) and (CKCEMID g ) only differ by a negative literal that is added to the premise on the far right in (CKCEMID g ). We consider precisely the same cases as in the proof of Proposition 6.8. Using the same notation, we note that the equality A 0 = · · · = A n in particular gives ¬A n , A 0 as a premise, and we use an additional cut on A 0 , followed by an instance of contraction, immediately prior to the application of (CKCEM) (that we replace by an instance of (CKCEMID g )) to show absorption of cut.
We now consider extending CK with both conditional modus ponens and conditional excluded middle, but have to take care of the cuts arising between MP g and CKCEM g , which leads to the new rule
that was obtained in the same way as (MP g ). If we denote the extension of CKCEM g with MP g and MPCEM g by CKCEMMP g , we obtain: Proposition 6.11. CKCEMMP g is absorbing and equivalent to CKCEMMP.
Proof. It is clear that the rule set CKCEMMP g absorbs the structural rules and it is easy to see that it is equivalent to CKCEMMP. We have to show that it absorbs cut.
Cuts between the conclusions of two instances of MP g have already been treated in the proof of Theorem 6.5, and the proof translates verbatim to cuts between instances of MPCEM g . We consider cuts between two instances
where the cut is performed on F ∈ F(Λ), say. The cases where either F ∈ Γ and ¬F in ∆ or F ∈ ∆ and ¬F ∈ Γ are straightforward.
witnesses that we may use Σ 1 = ¬B, Γ, ∆ as an axiom in GCKCEMMP + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ). Similarly, the derivation shows that the same is true for Σ 2 = B, Γ, ∆: note that in both cases, the cut was performed between an axiom and a conclusion of both rules. As size(B) < size(A ⇒ B) we may now use cut on B to establish that GCKCEMMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ) ⊢ Γ, ∆.
Case F = (A ⇒ B) and ¬F ∈ ∆. We have that ∆ = ¬(A ⇒ B), ∆ ′ . The derivation
as an axiom in GCKCEMMP + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ). The same derivation, with C replaced by ¬D shows that the same is true for
and an application of MP g yields derivability of
and ¬F ∈ Γ. Analogous by interchaning the role of MP g and MPCEM g .
This leaves to consider cuts between two instances of CKCEM g and MP g and between CKCEM g and MPCEM g . We first consider the rules
In this setting, all cases except the case F = (A ⇒ B) = (A i ⇒ B i ) with i > j are entirely analogous to those considered in the proof of Theorem 6.5 where applications of CK g need to be replaced by applications of CKCEM g . In case F = (A ⇒ B) = (A i ⇒ B i ) with i > j we assume without loss of generality that i = n and argue, as in the proof of Theorem 6.5, that
both are axioms of GCKCEMMP g + Cut(F, r 1 , r 2 ), leading to deductions ending in, repectively, Σ 1 , B 0 , . . . , B j , ¬B j+1 , . . . , ¬B n−1 and Σ 2 , ¬A 0 , B 1 , . . . , B j , ¬B j+1 , . . . ¬B n−1 . An application of MP g now yields derivability of (A 0 ⇒ B 0 ), . . . , (A j ⇒ B j ), ¬(A j+1 ⇒ B j+1 ), . . . , ¬(A n−1 ⇒ B n−1 ), B 1 , . . . , B j , ¬B j+1 , . . . , ¬B n−1 . Iterating the same schema, where MPCEM g is used instead of MP g to eliminate occurrences of ¬B i for i > j finally yields that (
To see that cuts between conclusions of CKCEM g and MPCEM g can be eliminated, one uses the same reasoning as above, with MPCEM g and MP g interchanged.
We note that the latter theorem was left as an open problem for the sequent system presented in [13] . To complete the treatment of conditional logics, we now turn to the system CKCEMMPID that arises by extending CK with the axioms correspoinding to conditional excluded middle, conditional modus ponens and identity. It follows by construction that the rule set CKCEMMPID g , that we take as containing all instances of CKCEMID g , (MP g ) and (MPCEM g ) induces a calculus that is equivalent to CKCEMMPID and we just have to establish absorption.
Proposition 6.12. The rule set CKCEMMPID g is equivalent to CKCEMMPID g and absorbing.
Proof. It is clear that CKCEMMPID g absorbs the structural rules (this was established before for each rule schema). To see that cut is absorbed, we proceed as in the proof of Proposition 6.11 where we replace every occurrence of (CKCEM g ) by the corresponding instance of (CKCEMID g ). The additional literal in the rightmost premise of (CKCEMID g ) is treated in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 6.3.
In summary, we obtain the following results about extensions of the conditional logic CK.
Theorem 6.13. Suppose that L is a combination of ID, MP, CEM. Then GL g ⊢ A whenever HL ⊢ A for all A ∈ F(Λ). Moreover, cut elimination holds in GL.
The theorem follows, in each of the cases, from Theorem 4.6 and Theorem 5.3 together with the fact that the rule set L and L g are equivalent and the latter is absorbing.
Complexity of Proof Search
It is comparatively straightforward to extract complexity bounds for provability of the logics considered above by analysing the complexity of proof search under suitable strategies in the cut-free sequent systems obtained. Clearly, in those cases where all modal rules peel off exactly one layer of modal operators, the depth of proofs is polynomial in the nesting depth of modal operators in the target formula, and therefore, proof search is in PSPACE under mild assumptions on the branching width of proofs [18, 14] . Besides reproving Ladner's classical result for K [12] , we thus have Theorem 7.1. Provability in CK and CKID is in PSPACE.
This reproves known complexity bounds originally shown in [13] (alternative short proofs using coalgebraic semantics are given in [17] ). For CKCEM, the bound can be improved to coNP using dynamic programming in the same style as in [20] . This concept has to be handled carefully when dealing with coNP bounds, however, as in nondeterministic programs we cannot actually pretend that during the execution of stage n we have the results of the stages up to n − 1 stored in memory -otherwise, we could, e.g., just negate these results and arrive at proving NP=coNP. Rather, dynamic programming should be regarded as a metaphor for merging identical computations on a non-deterministic machine; in particular, we need to take care to use results of previous stages only positively (as done in [20] ).
The point in our decision procedure where these considerations become relevant is that we will wish to apply rule (CKCEM g ) deterministically to subsequents that are as large as possible; i.e. we are interested in collecting maximal sets of conditional literals with provably B 0 ) , . . . , (A j ⇒ B j ), A j+1 ⇒ B j+1 , . . . , A n ⇒ B n be a sequent consisting of conditional literals. Then Γ is provable in CKCEM g iff for every decomposition of {0, . . . , n} into disjoint sets I 0 , . . . , I k (k ≥ 0), one of the following conditions holds.
(1) There exists l such that
(2) There exist l = r and i ∈ I l , p ∈ I r such that A i = A p is provable.
Proof. Only if: Since Γ consists of conditional literals, any proof of Γ must end in an application of rule CKCEM g . Thus, there exists I ⊆ {0, . . . , n} such that A i = A p is provable for all i, p ∈ I and {B i | i ∈ I, 0 ≤ i ≤ j} ∪ {¬B i | i ∈ I, j + 1 ≤ i ≤ n} is provable. Now let I o , . . . , I k be as in the statement. Then we have the following two cases: (1) There exists l such that I ⊆ I l . In this case, the first alternative of the claim holds. (2) We have i, p ∈ I and r = l such that i ∈ I r , p ∈ I l . In this case, the second alternative of the claim holds. If: Define an equivalence relation on {0, . . . , n} by taking i and p to be equivalent if A i = A p is provable, and let I 1 , . . . , I k be the induced disjoint decomposition of {0, . . . , n} into equivalence classes. By construction, this decomposition does not satisfy the second alternative of the claim, hence it satisfies the first, which implies that Γ is provable by applying rule CKCEM g .
This lemma now enables us to prove the announced coNP upper bound: Theorem 7.3. Provability in CKCEM and in CKIDCEM is in coNP.
Proof. Since some aspects of our algorithm are more easily understood in NP style, we prove that unprovability of a sequent Γ can be decided in NP. We use dynamic programming as in [20] : we proceed in stages; at stage i, we decide unprovability of all sequents of the form A, ¬B where A and B are subformulas of Γ with nesting depth of conditionals at most i. We perform such stages up to i = m − 1, where m is the maximal nesting depth of conditionals in Γ. In a further, final stage, we then check unprovability of Γ. As there are at most linearly many stages, it suffices to show that each stage can be performed in NP, and since there are at most quadratically many candidate sequents in each stage, it suffices that unprovability of a single candidate sequent can be checked in NP at each stage.
To this end, observe that proofs may generally be normalised to proceed as follows: first apply the propositional rules as long as possible, thus decomposing target sequents into sequents over conditional literals, i.e. literals of the form A ⇒ B or ¬(A ⇒ B), in the various branches of the proof, and only apply (CKCEM g ) when no more propositional rules are applicable (since all propositional rules monotonically increase the set of conditional literals when moving from the conclusion to the premises, it is clear that their -backwardsapplication never obstructs a possible application of (CKCEM g )). The existential branching that arises from the conjunction rule (A ∧ B, ∆ is unprovable if either A, ∆ or B, ∆ is unprovable) is handled non-deterministically. It is clear that one can apply only linearly many propositional rules in any given branch of the computation.
The application of rule (CKCEM g ) after exhaustion of the propositional rules is handled according to Lemma 7.2: to check that a sequent of the form ∆ = A 0 ⇒ B 0 , . . . , A j ⇒ B j , ¬(A j+1 ⇒ B j+1 ), . . . , ¬(A n ⇒ B n ) is unprovable, we guess a disjoint decomposition I 1 , . . . , I k of {0, . . . , n} and check that it violates Conditions (1) and (2) in the Lemma; the negation of these conditions introduces universal quantifiers over polynomial-sized ranges, which we check deterministically. Here, checking violation of Condition (2) amounts to using unprovability of quadratically many sequents checked in previous stages, which from the perspective of the present stage can be done in polynomial time. Checking violation of Condition (1) is more problematic, as it involves a recursive check of unprovability of sequents ∆ l = {B i | i ∈ I l , 0 ≤ i ≤ j} ∪ {¬B i | i ∈ I l , j + 1 ≤ i ≤ n} for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k; specifically, we have to ensure that this recursion, whose depth is limited by the nesting depth of conditionals in Γ, does not lead to exponentially long computation paths.
To this end, we note that the breadth of the part of the proof tree that we explore in one computation is given by a function f (∆) that obeys a recursive equation of the form
where
because I 0 , . . . , I k is a disjoint decomposition of {0, . . . , n}. It follows easily that f (∆) is at most linear in ∆, and hence the overall size of the part of the proof tree explored in one computation is at most quadratic. This finishes the proof for the case of CKCEM.
The proof for CKIDCEM is entirely analogous, noting that although the main premise in rule (CKIDCEM g ) is by one literal ¬A 0 larger that in the case of (CKCEM g ), estimate (7.1) remains true.
More interesting are those cases where some of the modal operators from the conclusion remain in the premise, such as T, K4, CKMP, and CKMPCEM (where the difference between non-iterative logics, i.e. ones whose Hilbert-axiomatisation does not use nested modalities, such as T, CKMP, and CKMPCEM, and iterative logics such as K4 is surprisingly hard to spot in the sequent presentation). For K4, the standard approach is to consider proofs of minimal depth, which therefore never attempt to prove a sequent repeatedly, and analyse the maximal depth that a branch of a proof can have without repeating a sequent. For T, a different strategy is used, where the (T ) rule is limited to be applied at most once to every formula of the form ¬ A in between two applications of (K) [10] . A similar strategy works for the conditional logics CKMP and CKMPCEM, which we explain in some additional detail for CKMP. We let CKMP 0 g and CKMP 1 g denote restricted sequent systems, defined as follows.
• In CKMP 0 g , a formula ¬(A ⇒ B) is marked on a branch as soon as the rule (MP g ) has been applied to it (backwards) and unmarked only at the next application of rule (CK g ). Rule (MP g ) applies only to unmarked formulas.
• In CKMP Proof. The inductive proof for CKMP g can just be copied due to the fact that absorption of inversion by CKMP g never involves the introduction of additional applications of (MP g ), and the conclusion of instances of inversion never introduces additional propositional descendants (unlike, e.g., in the case of weakening).
This enables us to prove the missing inclusion: Lemma 7.6. Every sequent that is provable in CKMP g is provable in CKMP 1 g . Proof. By Lemma 7.5, it suffices to prove that we can replace backwards applications of (MP g ) to sequents ¬(A ⇒ B), Γ with Γ containing a propositional descendant of either A or ¬B, with subproofs using inversion. This is clear: e.g. if Γ contains a propositional descendant of A, then ¬(A → B), Γ can be proved from ¬(A → B), A, Γ alone by repeated application of inversion. The same line of reasoning applies essentially without change to CKIDMP, so that provability in CKIDMP is in PSPACE.
The same approach works for logics that include (CEM), with the only actual modification being that in the systems CKMPCEM 0 g and CKIDMPCEM 0 g , backwards application of both (MP g ) and (MPCEM g ) is restricted to unmarked formulas. Equivalence of the restricted systems to the full systems is shown in the same manner as for CKMP. We then have, in analogy to Theorem 7.3 Theorem 7.9. Provability in CKMPCEM and in CKIDMPCEM is in PSPACE.
We note that the complexity of CKMPCEM was explicitly left open in [13] . We also note that regrettably we were not able to reproduce our claim from [18] that CKMPCEM is in coNP, the problem being that the estimate (7.1) breaks down in the presence of (MP g ) and (MPCEM) g ; since no better lower bound than coNP is currently known for CKMPCEM and CKIDMPCEM, this means that the exact complexity of these logics remains open.
Conclusions
We have established a generic method of cut elimination in modal sequent system based on absorption of cut and structural rules by sets of modal rules. We have applied this method in particular to various conditional logics, thus obtaining cut-free unlabelled sequent calculi that complement recently introduced labelled calculi [13] . In at least one case, the conditional logic CKMPCEM with modus ponens and conditional excluded middle, our calculus seems to be the first cut-free calculus in the literature, as cut elimination for the corresponding calculus in [13] was explicitly left open. We have applied these calculi to obtain complexity bounds on proof search in conditional logics; in particular we have reproved known upper complexity bounds for CK, CKID, CKMP [13] and improved the bound for CKCEM and CKIDCEM from PSPACE to coNP using dynamic programming techniques following [20] . Moreover, we have obtained an upper bound PSPACE for CKMPCEM, for which no bound has previously been published; a strong suspicion remains, however, that this logic is actually in coNP. We conjecture that our general method can also be applied to other base logics, e.g. intuitionistic propositional logic or first-order logic; this is the subject of further investigations.
